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Detecting malware based on mismatch between user interface and computation load
ABSTRACT
Techniques to detect malicious code running underlying a user interface are described.
The software application is detected as potential malware if a mismatch is detected between the
interface presented to the user and computations performed by the application that presents the
user interface. A trained machine learning model is applied for such detection. With user
permission, a sequence of rendered images that represent the user interface and a sequence of
execution traces sampled from computational operations performed by the application that
presents the interface are provided as inputs the model. The model outputs a score indicative of
appropriateness of the amount of computation for the user interface.
KEYWORDS
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BACKGROUND
Various forms of malware, e.g., viruses, spyware, crypto mining malware, etc. attempt to
utilize computational resources of a user device without user knowledge or permission. For
example, malicious actors may surreptitiously run code for certain computationally intensive
operations such as cryptocurrency mining, dictionary attacks on user passwords and other
cryptanalytic operations, etc. on unsuspecting user devices, while the user is engaged in other
activity such as viewing a webpage. For example, a user may spend significant time reading a
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news website or blog, which allows malware on such websites to deploy code on the user’s
device for malicious operations. Malware may also be utilized to coordinate network traffic from
a large number of user devices, e.g., to launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
While some users may detect such malware, e.g., by observing excessive computational
load, by use of antimalware tools that detect particular signatures of malicious code, etc., it is
difficult for many users to detect and prevent such use of their devices. Some current
antimalware tools detect malware by matching computation patterns with known malware
patterns.
DESCRIPTION
Techniques described herein detect a mismatch between a user interface and computation
load on a user device by applying a machine learning model. The techniques are implemented
only if users provide permission to access data on rendered user interface and corresponding
computational load. Users are provided with options to deny such permission, provide
permission selectively, and to change the permission at any time. For example, permission may
be obtained at an initial setup stage (e.g., of a user device or account), and is modifiable by the
user.

Fig. 1 Malware detection by comparison of UI and execution traces
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Fig. 1 illustrates use of a malware detector (105) that utilizes a model trained to detect
mismatches (106) between user interface and code execution. The model computes a score based
on the determined match of the ongoing computation with the user interface that is presented to a
user. When the user permits, a sequence of images that represent the user interface (102) and a
sequence of execution traces sampled from operations performed by the application that
generates the interface (104) are provided as inputs to the ML model. For example, execution
traces may be sampled periodically, e.g., over one to three seconds.
Based on the processing of the pair of sequences, it is determined if there is a mismatch
between the information presented on the interface and the computation that supports the
interface (106). For example, if the user interface is a simple webpage that waits for user input,
e.g., navigation input for scrolling the page, a mismatch is detected if greater than a threshold
amount of computation is performed, e.g., greater than typical computational load to render the
page itself. The model outputs a score, e.g., between 0 and 1, based on the provided inputs.
If the score indicates a mismatch, various mitigating actions can be taken. For example, a
malware warning can be displayed (108) on the user interface. When the underlying computation
is characterized, the message can include further details, e.g., “the computational requirements
for this application are indicative of unauthorized use of your device for crypto mining.”
The machine learning model can be implemented with common neural network modules
as building blocks, for example, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for processing images of
rendered user interfaces, and recurrent neural networks (RNNs) for processing variable-length
sequence inputs. To process the execution traces, an embedding layer for different instructions
that are present in the execution traces can be used, which is dependent on the position of the
model in the software stack. The sequences of execution traces can be provided by the
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application, a web browser that displays a webpage, when the model is implemented within the
browser or as a browser add-on. The model can also be included in the operating system of the
user device. When the model is built into the browser, the browser is instrumented to capture
execution traces and provide those to the model. If malware detection is provided as a service,
the application developer may provide an instrumented version of the code to permit capture of
execution traces.
The machine learning model can be trained, e.g., by using synthetically generated cases
that combine simple user interfaces with heavy computation loads, on known malicious websites
and applications, and by using human-annotated data if available. For example, the training data
can comprise pairs of screen-images and execution traces of corresponding under the hood
computations.
The techniques described herein utilize the execution trace which is a precise measure of
malicious computations. For example, an execution trace may show a signature of a large
number of matrix multiplications, or calls to a graphical processing unit (GPU), when the
rendered user interface images indicate that no image was displayed that would require such
computations. The use of the execution trace makes the techniques described herein
advantageous over conventional approaches that use typical load measurements, e.g., CPU load,
memory usage, etc. to identify malware, since such measurements may not be granular enough to
differentiate between malicious and benign code.
The described techniques are advantageous due to the ability to detect previously
unknown malicious code for which the signature is not known. Further, the techniques may also
find alternative applications, e.g., to determine efficiency of software code vs. benchmark code
that provides similar user interface.
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In situations in which certain implementations discussed herein may collect or use
personal information about users (e.g., user data, information about a user’s social network,
user's location and time at the location, user's biometric information, user's activities and
demographic information), users are provided with one or more opportunities to control whether
information is collected, whether the personal information is stored, whether the personal
information is used, and how the information is collected about the user, stored and used. That is,
the systems and methods discussed herein collect, store and/or use user personal information
specifically upon receiving explicit authorization from the relevant users to do so.
For example, a user is provided with control over whether programs or features collect
user information about that particular user or other users relevant to the program or feature. Each
user for which personal information is to be collected is presented with one or more options to
allow control over the information collection relevant to that user, to provide permission or
authorization as to whether the information is collected and as to which portions of the
information are to be collected. For example, users can be provided with one or more such
control options over a communication network. In addition, certain data may be treated in one or
more ways before it is stored or used so that personally identifiable information is removed. As
one example, a user’s identity may be treated so that no personally identifiable information can
be determined. As another example, a user’s geographic location may be generalized to a larger
region so that the user's particular location cannot be determined.
CONCLUSION
Techniques to detect malicious code running underlying a user interface are described.
The software application is detected as potential malware if a mismatch is detected between the
interface presented to the user and computations performed by the application that presents the
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user interface. A trained machine learning model is applied for such detection. With user
permission, a sequence of rendered images that represent the user interface and a sequence of
execution traces sampled from computational operations performed by the application that
presents the interface are provided as inputs the model. The model outputs a score indicative of
appropriateness of the amount of computation for the user interface.
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